I. PROMOTE ROBUST SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL FIRMS

A. Create a Financial Services Oversight Council

1. We propose the creation of a Financial Services Oversight Council to facilitate information sharing and coordination, identify emerging risks, advise the Federal Reserve on the identification of firms whose failure could pose a threat to financial stability due to their combination of size, leverage, and interconnectedness (hereafter referred to as a Tier 1 FHC), and provide a forum for resolving jurisdictional disputes between regulators.

a. The membership of the Council should include
(i) the Secretary of the Treasury, who shall serve as the Chairman;
(ii) the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System;
(iii) the Director of the National Bank Supervisor;
(iv) the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency;
(v) the Chairman of the SEC;
(vi) the Chairman of the CFTC;
(vii) the Chairman of the FDIC; and
(viii) the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).

b. The Council should be supported by a permanent, full-time expert staff at Treasury. The staff should be responsible for providing the Council with the information and resources it needs to fulfill its responsibilities.

2. Our legislation will propose to give the Council the authority to gather information from any financial firm and the responsibility for referring emerging risks to the attention of regulators with the authority to respond.

B. Implement Heightened Consolidated Supervision and Regulation of All Large, Interconnected Financial Firms

1. Any financial firm whose combination of size, leverage, and interconnectedness could pose a threat to financial stability if it failed (Tier 1 FHC) should be subject to robust consolidated supervision and regulation, regardless of whether the firm owns an insured depository institution.

2. The Federal Reserve Board should have the authority and accountability for consolidated supervision and regulation of Tier 1 FHCs.

3. Our legislation will propose criteria that the Federal Reserve must consider in identifying Tier 1 FHCs.

4. The prudential standards for Tier 1 FHCs – including capital, liquidity and risk management standards – should be stricter and more conservative than those applicable to other financial firms to account for the greater risks that their potential failure would impose on the financial system.

5. Consolidated supervision of a Tier 1 FHC should extend to the parent company and to all of its subsidiaries – regulated and unregulated, U.S. and

foreign. Functionally regulated and depository institution subsidiaries of a Tier 1 FHC should continue to be supervised and regulated primarily by their functional or bank regulator, as the case may be. The constraints that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB Act) introduced on the Federal Reserve’s ability to require reports from, examine, or impose higher prudential requirements or more stringent activity restrictions on the functionally regulated or depository institution subsidiaries of FHCs should be removed.

6. Consolidated supervision of a Tier 1 FHC should be macroprudential in focus. That is, it should consider risk to the system as a whole.

7. The Federal Reserve, in consultation with Treasury and external experts, should propose recommendations by October 1, 2009 to better align its structure and governance with its authorities and responsibilities.

C. Strengthen Capital and Other Prudential Standards For All Banks and BHCs

1. Treasury will lead a working group, with participation by federal financial regulatory agencies and outside experts that will conduct a fundamental reassessment of existing regulatory capital requirements for banks and BHCs, including new Tier 1 FHCs. The working group will issue a report with its conclusions by December 31, 2009.

2. Treasury will lead a working group, with participation by federal financial regulatory agencies and outside experts, that will conduct a fundamental reassessment of the supervision of banks and BHCs. The working group will issue a report with its conclusions by October 1, 2009.

3. Federal regulators should issue standards and guidelines to better align executive compensation practices of financial firms with long-term shareholder value and to prevent compensation practices from providing incentives that could threaten the safety and soundness of supervised institutions. In addition, we will support legislation requiring all public companies to hold non-binding shareholder resolutions on the compensation packages of senior executive officers, as well as new requirements to make compensation committees more independent.

4. Capital and management requirements for FHC status should not be limited to the subsidiary depository institution. All FHCs should be required to meet the capital and management requirements on a consolidated basis as well.

5. The accounting standard setters (the FASB, the IASB, and the SEC) should review accounting standards to determine how financial firms should be required to employ more forward-looking loan loss provisioning practices that incorporate a broader range of available credit information. Fair value accounting rules also should be reviewed with the goal of identifying changes that could provide users of financial reports with both fair value information and greater transparency regarding the cash flows management expects to receive by holding investments.

6. Firewalls between banks and their affiliates should be strengthened to protect the federal safety net that supports banks and to better prevent spread of the subsidy inherent in the federal safety net to bank affiliates.

D. Close Loopholes in Bank Regulation

1. We propose the creation of a new federal government agency, the National Bank Supervisor (NBS), to conduct prudential supervision and regulation of all federally chartered depository institutions, and all federal branches and agencies of foreign banks.

2. We propose to eliminate the federal thrift charter, but to preserve its interstate branching rules and apply them to state and national banks.

3. All companies that control an insured depository institution, however organized, should be subject to robust consolidated supervision and regulation at the federal level by the Federal Reserve and should be subject to the nonbanking activity restrictions of the BHC Act. The policy of separating banking from commerce should be re-affirmed and strengthened. We must close loopholes in the BHC Act for thrift holding companies, industrial loan companies, credit card banks, trust companies, and grandfathered “nonbank” banks.

E. Eliminate the SEC’s Programs for Consolidated Supervision

The SEC has ended its Consolidated Supervised Entity Program, under which it had been the holding company supervisor for companies such as Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns. We propose also eliminating the SEC’s Supervised Investment Bank Holding Company program. Investment banking firms that seek consolidated supervision by a U.S. regulator should be subject to supervision and regulation by the Federal Reserve.

F. Require Hedge Funds and Other Private Pools of Capital to Register

All advisers to hedge funds (and other private pools of capital, including private equity funds and venture capital funds) whose assets under management exceed some modest threshold should be required to register with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act. The advisers should be required to report information on the funds they manage that is sufficient to assess whether any fund poses a threat to financial stability.

G. Reduce the Susceptibility of Money Market Mutual Funds (MMFs) to Runs

The SEC should move forward with its plans to strengthen the regulatory framework around MMFs to reduce the credit and liquidity risk profile of individual MMFs and to make the MMF industry as a whole less susceptible to runs. The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets should prepare a report assessing whether more fundamental changes are necessary to further reduce the MMF industry’s susceptibility to runs, such as eliminating the ability
of a MMF to use a stable net asset value or requiring MMFs to obtain access to
reliable emergency liquidity facilities from private sources.

H. Enhance Oversight of the Insurance Sector

Our legislation will propose the establishment of the Office of National Insurance within Treasury to gather information, develop expertise, negotiate international agreements, and coordinate policy in the insurance sector. Treasury will support proposals to modernize and improve our system of insurance regulation in accordance with six principles outlined in the body of the report.

I. Determine the Future Role of the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs)

Treasury and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, in consultation with other government agencies, will engage in a wide-ranging initiative to develop recommendations on the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank system. We need to maintain the continued stability and strength of the GSEs during these difficult financial times.
We will report to the Congress and the American public at the time of the President’s 2011 Budget release.

II. ESTABLISH COMPREHENSIVE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS

A. Strengthen Supervision and Regulation of Securitization Markets

1. Federal banking agencies should promulgate regulations that require originators or sponsors to retain an economic interest in a material portion of the credit risk of securitized credit exposures.

2. Regulators should promulgate additional regulations to align compensation of market participants with longer term performance of the underlying loans.

3. The SEC should continue its efforts to increase the transparency and standardization of securitization markets and be given clear authority to require robust reporting by issuers of asset backed securities (ABS).

4. The SEC should continue its efforts to strengthen the regulation of credit rating agencies, including measures to promote robust policies and procedures that manage and disclose conflicts of interest, differentiate between structured and other products, and otherwise strengthen the integrity of the ratings process.

5. Regulators should reduce their use of credit ratings in regulations and supervisory practices, wherever possible.

B. Create Comprehensive Regulation of All OTC Derivatives, Including Credit
Default Swaps (CDS)

All OTC derivatives markets, including CDS markets, should be subject to comprehensive regulation that addresses relevant public policy objectives:
(1) preventing activities in those markets from posing risk to the financial system;
(2) promoting the efficiency and transparency of those markets; (3) preventing market manipulation, fraud, and other market abuses; and (4) ensuring that OTC derivatives are not marketed inappropriately to unsophisticated parties.

C. Harmonize Futures and Securities Regulation

The CFTC and the SEC should make recommendations to Congress for changes to statutes and regulations that would harmonize regulation of futures and securities.

D. Strengthen Oversight of Systemically Important Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Systems and Related Activities

We propose that the Federal Reserve have the responsibility and authority to conduct oversight of systemically important payment, clearing and settlement systems, and activities of financial firms.

E. Strengthen Settlement Capabilities and Liquidity Resources of Systemically Important Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Systems

We propose that the Federal Reserve have authority to provide systemically important payment, clearing, and settlement systems access to Reserve Bank accounts, financial services, and the discount window.

III. PROTECT CONSUMERS AND INVESTORS FROM FINANCIAL ABUSE

A. Create a New Consumer Financial Protection Agency

1. We propose to create a single primary federal consumer protection supervisor to protect consumers of credit, savings, payment, and other consumer financial products and services, and to regulate providers of such products and services.

2. The CFPA should have broad jurisdiction to protect consumers in consumer financial products and services such as credit, savings, and payment products.

3. The CFPA should be an independent agency with stable, robust funding.

4. The CFPA should have sole rule-making authority for consumer financial protection statutes, as well as the ability to fill gaps through rule-making.

5. The CFPA should have supervisory and enforcement authority and jurisdiction over all persons covered by the statutes that it implements, including both insured depositories and the range of other firms not previously subject to comprehensive federal supervision, and it should work with the Department of Justice to enforce the statutes under its jurisdiction in
federal court.

6. The CFPA should pursue measures to promote effective regulation, including conducting periodic reviews of regulations, an outside advisory council, and coordination with the Council.

7. The CFPA’s strong rules would serve as a floor, not a ceiling. The states should have the ability to adopt and enforce stricter laws for institutions of all types, regardless of charter, and to enforce federal law concurrently with respect to institutions of all types, also regardless of charter.

8. The CFPA should coordinate enforcement efforts with the states.

9. The CFPA should have a wide variety of tools to enable it to perform its functions effectively.

10. The Federal Trade Commission should also be given better tools and additional resources to protect consumers.

B. Reform Consumer Protection

1. Transparency. We propose a new proactive approach to disclosure. The CFPA will be authorized to require that all disclosures and other communications with consumers be reasonable: balanced in their presentation of benefits, and clear and conspicuous in their identification of costs, penalties, and risks.

2. Simplicity. We propose that the regulator be authorized to define standards for “plain vanilla” products that are simpler and have straightforward pricing. The CFPA should be authorized to require all providers and intermediaries to offer these products prominently, alongside whatever other lawful products they choose to offer.

3. Fairness. Where efforts to improve transparency and simplicity prove inadequate to prevent unfair treatment and abuse, we propose that the CFPA be authorized to place tailored restrictions on product terms and provider practices, if the benefits outweigh the costs. Moreover, we propose to authorize the Agency to impose appropriate duties of care on financial
intermediaries.

4. Access. The Agency should enforce fair lending laws and the Community Reinvestment Act and otherwise seek to ensure that underserved consumers and communities have access to prudent financial services, lending, and investment.

C. Strengthen Investor Protection

1. The SEC should be given expanded authority to promote transparency in investor disclosures.

2. The SEC should be given new tools to increase fairness for investors by establishing a fiduciary duty for broker-dealers offering investment advice and harmonizing the regulation of investment advisers and broker-dealers.

3. Financial firms and public companies should be accountable to their clients and investors by expanding protections for whistleblowers, expanding sanctions available for enforcement, and requiring non-binding shareholder votes on executive pay plans.

4. Under the leadership of the Financial Services Oversight Council, we propose the establishment of a Financial Consumer Coordinating Council with a broad membership of federal and state consumer protection agencies, and a permanent role for the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee.

5. Promote retirement security for all Americans by strengthening employmentbased and private retirement plans and encouraging adequate savings.

IV. PROVIDE THE GOVERNMENT WITH THE TOOLS IT NEEDS TO MANAGE FINANCIAL CRISES

A. Create a Resolution Regime for Failing BHCs, Including Tier 1 FHCs

We recommend the creation of a resolution regime to avoid the disorderly resolution of failing BHCs, including Tier 1 FHCs, if a disorderly resolution would have serious adverse effects on the financial system or the economy. The regime would supplement (rather than replace) and be modeled on to the existing resolution regime for insured depository institutions under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.

B. Amend the Federal Reserve’s Emergency Lending Authority

We will propose legislation to amend Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to require the prior written approval of the Secretary of the Treasury for any extensions of credit by the Federal Reserve to individuals, partnerships, or corporations in “unusual and exigent circumstances.”

V. RAISE INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY STANDARDS AND IMPROVE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

A. Strengthen the International Capital Framework

We recommend that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) continue to modify and improve Basel II by refining the risk weights applicable to the trading book and securitized products, introducing a supplemental leverage ratio, and improving the definition of capital by the end of 2009. We also urge the BCBS to complete an in-depth review of the Basel II framework to mitigate its procyclical effects.

B. Improve the Oversight of Global Financial Markets

We urge national authorities to promote the standardization and improved oversight of credit derivative and other OTC derivative markets, in particular through the use of central counterparties, along the lines of the G-20 commitment, and to advance these goals through international coordination and cooperation.

C. Enhance Supervision of Internationally Active Financial Firms

We recommend that the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and national authorities implement G-20 commitments to strengthen arrangements for international cooperation on supervision of global financial firms through establishment and continued operational development of supervisory colleges.

D. Reform Crisis Prevention and Management Authorities and Procedures

We recommend that the BCBS expedite its work to improve cross-border resolution of global financial firms and develop recommendations by the end of 2009. We further urge national authorities to improve information-sharing arrangements and implement the FSB principles for cross-border crisis management.

E. Strengthen the Financial Stability Board

We recommend that the FSB complete its restructuring and institutionalize its new mandate to promote global financial stability by September 2009.

F. Strengthen Prudential Regulations

We recommend that the BCBS take steps to improve liquidity risk management standards for financial firms and that the FSB work with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and standard setters to develop macroprudential tools.

G. Expand the Scope of Regulation

1. Determine the appropriate Tier 1 FHC definition and application of requirements for foreign financial firms.

2. We urge national authorities to implement by the end of 2009 the G-20 commitment to require hedge funds or their managers to register and disclose appropriate information necessary to assess the systemic risk they pose individually or collectively

H. Introduce Better Compensation Practices

In line with G-20 commitments, we urge each national authority to put guidelines in place to align compensation with long-term shareholder value and to promote compensation structures do not provide incentives for excessive risk taking. We recommend that the BCBS expediently integrate the FSB principles on compensation into its risk management guidance by the end of 2009.

I. Promote Stronger Standards in the Prudential Regulation, Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing, and Tax Information Exchange Areas

1. We urge the FSB to expeditiously establish and coordinate peer reviews to assess compliance and implementation of international regulatory standards, with priority attention on the international cooperation elements of prudential regulatory standards.

2. The United States will work to implement the updated International Cooperation Review Group (ICRG) peer review process and work with partners in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to address jurisdictions not complying with international anti-money laundering/terrorist financing (AML/CFT) standards.

J. Improve Accounting Standards

1. We recommend that the accounting standard setters clarify and make consistent the application of fair value accounting standards, including the impairment of financial instruments, by the end of 2009.

2. We recommend that the accounting standard setters improve accounting standards for loan loss provisioning by the end of 2009 that would make it more forward looking, as long as the transparency of financial statements is not compromised.

3. We recommend that the accounting standard setters make substantial progress by the end of 2009 toward development of a single set of high quality global accounting standards.

K. Tighten Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies

We urge national authorities to enhance their regulatory regimes to effectively oversee credit rating agencies (CRAs), consistent with international standards and the G-20 Leaders’ recommendations.