Hedge Fund Allocations Are Now Judged Against Private Credit, Not Cash

Hedge Fund Allocations Are Now Judged Against Private Credit, Not Cash

HedgeCo.Net — Two prints from the same week point in opposite directions. Maryland’s $80.6 billion state pension system is winding down its roughly $4 billion Absolute Return portfolio and moving the money toward private credit and infrastructure. Yet Citco-administered hedge funds took in $4.1 billion of net inflows in October, their tenth straight month of positive flows, even as they lost 1.2%. The money is not leaving the asset class; it is being re-underwritten. The question this week puts to allocators is no longer whether a hedge fund sleeve beats cash with low correlation, but whether each line in it earns more than the contractual yield that private credit now offers in its place.

Maryland’s documents make the new benchmark explicit. The system expected hedge funds to beat three-month Treasury bills by 4% to 5% over a full cycle with low correlation to equities. The Absolute Return book cleared that bar last year with a 10.7% gain, but the system’s stocks rose 16.3%, and the hedge fund portfolio had underperformed in prior years. Clearing the hurdle was not enough to keep the allocation. The long-term policy that takes effect after October 2028 carries a dedicated 8% private credit allocation and a 15% real assets allocation, with no standalone absolute return line. Managers in the program have included Brevan Howard, ExodusPoint, King Street, Kirkoswald and Bridgewater’s Pure Alpha.

New Mexico PERA shows how the test is being applied in practice. Its chief investment officer, Michael Shackelford, has recommended taking the plan’s hedge fund allocation to zero over the long term by winding down underperforming funds without replacing them, while keeping the option to retain stronger performers. The proposal still needs board approval, but the mechanism matters: this is not a verdict on hedge funds as a category. It is a fund-by-fund comparison in which each manager has to justify its seat against the alternative use of the same capital.

That alternative now carries a published price. BlackRock’s HPS has begun raising Specialty Loan Fund VII with an initial $9.5 billion equity target, lending to companies with at least $75 million of annual EBITDA and targeting a return of about 10%. That is roughly what Maryland’s hedge fund book earned in a strong year, in a structure built around contractual yield rather than manager discretion. Private credit is not free of risk; retail-oriented vehicles across the industry have faced redemption pressure this year over asset quality and software-loan exposure. But for a public plan with a return target, a stated lending return of about 10% is the comparison a hedge fund line now has to win.

The industry data show which hedge fund exposures are winning that comparison. Citco’s October figures put year-to-date returns at 9.2%, with more than half of funds in the red for the month and the spread between top- and bottom-decile performance widening to 12.5% from 10.9%. Global macro lost 4.5% and equity funds 2.4%, while multi-strategy funds slipped just 0.1%. Flows followed resilience and scale: multi-strategy funds have drawn $71.3 billion of the $136 billion in year-to-date net subscriptions, funds above $10 billion took $3.9 billion of net inflows in October, and the $1 billion to $3 billion cohort saw $1.3 billion of outflows.

Managers are reading the same scorecard. Viking Global, a $35 billion firm, told investors its long-short spread, which it calls its “Holy Grail” KPI, was just 0.3% in the third quarter, and the flagship was up about 1% for the year after losing 1.2% in October. Andreas Halvorsen’s diagnosis was that the book had been “too balanced,” and Viking is pushing analysts and portfolio managers to size up their best ideas, with incentives adjusted to reward those bets. A diversified, risk-balanced book that delivers a spread near zero is exactly the exposure Maryland and New Mexico PERA are now declining to pay for.

For allocators, the practical step is to re-underwrite each hedge fund line against the private credit alternative rather than against T-bills. Map which managers have delivered a return engine that private credit cannot replicate, such as the resilience multi-strategy platforms showed in October, and which have produced equity-like drawdowns or near-zero spreads that a 10% lending target would beat outright. The correlation benefit still counts, but Maryland’s decision shows it no longer carries a line on its own. The allocator question is simple to state and harder to answer: for every dollar in the hedge fund sleeve, what does it earn above what the same dollar could contract for in direct lending?

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